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AKZO AND THE DEBATE ON IN-HOUSE PRIVILEGE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Clinton R. Long*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Within the realm of rights and privileges that attorneys enjoy,
attorney-client privilege is one of the most essential. Some have called
this right a “time-honored sanctuary”1 and “common law’s oldest
privilege.”2 Some say that legal privilege even dates back to the time of
the Roman Empire.3 Indeed, just about “every article, case, and treatise
on the attorney-client privilege begins with the observation that the
attorney-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary privilege recognized in
Anglo-American common law.”4 It is clear that attorneys take this
privilege very seriously and seek its expansion while cringing at any
limitations placed thereon. These advocates have had many reasons to
cringe lately. Many are claiming that privilege is under attack in the
United States.5 The doctrine is becoming more and more restricted by the
federal government as the government faces increasingly complicated
crises.6 Corporate scandals, terrorism, and a number of other issues
challenge the U.S. government and many others abroad,7 which make it
understandable that any evidentiary benefit a government can gain in an
investigation will be welcomed. However, when this comes at the price
of limiting the attorney-client privilege, compromise can be difficult to
find between the competing interests of protecting the law and
maintaining privacy in the attorney-client relationship.
This debate is not specific to attorneys and the government in the
United States. A recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (ECJ) has enlivened a similar debate in the European Union (EU)
regarding privilege in the corporate attorney setting. In its recently
decided case, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, the ECJ
confirmed previous case law8 and affirmed the General Court’s decision
in the immediate case by concluding that privilege does not exist for in-

* LL.M. Candidate—Class of 2012, George Washington University Law School.
1
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to
the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 899 (2006).
2
Stephen A. Calhoun, Note, Globalization's Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and What
U.S. Courts Can Do to Prevent It, 87 TEX L. REV. 235, 265 (2008).
3
See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Norman K. Thompson & Captain Joshua E. Kastenberg, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Practical Military Applications of a Professional Core Value, 49 A.F. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978)).
4
Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the
Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 474 (2003).
5
See, e.g., id.
6
See, e.g., id. at 471.
7
See, e.g., id.
8
Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575.
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house attorneys in relation to the EU and its investigations.9 Not
surprisingly, in-house attorneys in Europe are not pleased with this
decision, which renders communications that they have with employees
of their corporations completely subject to the investigations of the
European Commission (Commission). Competition attorneys, which
were at the center of the Commission’s investigation in Akzo, are
particularly impacted by this decision because of the frequency with
which they can be subject to Commission investigations. However, this
ruling affects all in-house attorneys by limiting the advice they can give
and the quantity of written communication they can use without
compromising the privacy of their clients’ information.
The critics have reason to be upset. Akzo appears to be outdated; the
ECJ followed case law that was decided in 1982. This case was decided
before the advent of e-mail and when the proliferation of in-house
counsel was not nearly as great as it is now. Akzo not only appears to be
outdated, it favors too heavily one policy argument over another. It is
understandable that the EU wants to obtain incriminating evidence,
especially in competition investigations when evidence might be hard to
find. However, the Court favored this far more in Akzo than the ability of
clients and their in-house attorneys to freely discuss legal issues. This
ignores the crippling effect that withholding privilege could have on inhouse counsel.
In-house counsel should benefit from privilege at the EU level, as
outside counsel already does. However, in order to find the proper
balance of protecting the attorney-client relationship and the
Commission’s ability to investigate potential competition or other legal
issues, the Commission should also be able to acquire documents that
display evidence of illegal behavior. A decision on what should be
disclosed in an investigation should be left to an independent tribunal
and not to either party in the investigation. This will balance the policy
interests of both sides of the debate by giving in-house attorneys
privilege, but also enabling the Commission to override the privilege
when a privileged communication manifests illegality.
Before elaborating upon this policy suggestion, this article first
presents a brief summary of the facts and procedural posture of Akzo. An
analysis of whether the ECJ made the proper decision in Akzo follows.
Next, a discussion of the key public policy arguments both in favor of
and against extending privilege to in-house attorneys in the EU is
presented. Finally, this article argues for extending privilege to in-house
attorneys while also reserving the ability of the Commission and any
other EU institution to investigate potential competition law or other
legal violations.

9
Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. & Akcros Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ EURLex LEXIS 807 (Sept. 14, 2010).
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II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF
AKZO
In early 2003, officials from the Commission visited the office of
Akzo/Akcros in the United Kingdom to investigate potential violations
of EU competition laws.10 During the investigation, the officials took
copies of a large number of company documents.11 However, a dispute
arose over a few of the documents and whether privilege extended to
them.12 Akzo/Akcros said that the documents were privileged and thus
not subject to review by the Commission, while the Commission said
that they would examine the documents to determine if privilege would
apply.13 The officials at Akzo/Akcros objected, and the Commission told
them that this might constitute obstruction of a Commission
investigation.14 The parties agreed that an Akzo/Akcros representative
could watch while the Commission investigation’s leader determined
whether the five documents at issue were privileged.15
The Commission deemed three of them definitely not protected by
privilege; two of these were e-mails between Akcros’ general manager
and a Dutch in-house attorney of Akzo’s who is a registered advocaat in
the Netherlands.16 After the Commission took copies of these documents,
Akzo/Akcros attempted, and failed, to persuade the Commission to
reconsider its decision through a letter explaining why the documents
were privileged.17 After another opportunity for Akzo/Akcros to prove
that the documents were privileged, the Commission made a final
decision that the documents were not privileged.18 The General Court
agreed with the Commission when Akzo/Akcros challenged these
Commission decisions. The main reason the General Court decided that
privilege did not extend to the documents was because the ECJ requires
that the attorney involved be independent of the client to receive
privilege; in-house counsel does not qualify as independent.19
Akzo/Akcros appealed on three grounds. First, Akzo/Akcros argued
that the General Court incorrectly interpreted the independence
requirement of privilege, and this resulted in unequal treatment of inhouse counsel as compared to outside counsel.20 Instead of a “literal and
partial interpretation” of AM & S Europe, which is what the parties claim
the General Court used, the General Court should have used a

10
Case T-125/03, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. & Akcros Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II03523, ¶ 2.
11
Id.
12
Id. ¶ 3.
13
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
14
Id. ¶ 3.
15
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
16
Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
17
Id. ¶ 10.
18
Id. ¶¶ 11, 14
19
Id. ¶¶ 166–69.
20
Case C-550/07, supra note 9, ¶ 30.
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“teleological” interpretation.21 The appellants argued that two paragraphs
from AM & S Europe actually show that “the Court of Justice does not
equate the existence of an employment relationship with a lack of
independence on the part of the lawyer.”22 Also, the appellants said that
their attorney was independent:
An in-house lawyer enrolled at a Bar or Law Society is, simply on
account of his obligations of professional conduct and discipline, just
as independent as an external lawyer. Furthermore, the guarantees of
independence enjoyed by an ‘advocaat in dienstbetrekking’, that is
an enrolled lawyer in an employment relationship under Dutch law,
are particularly significant.23
Second, the Akzo/Akcros argued that the ECJ decided AM & S
Europe at a time when fewer countries recognized in-house counsel
communication as privileged, and also that EU law has developed to the
point where privilege should extend to in-house counsel
communication.24 The General Court’s decision “lowers the level of
protection of the rights of defence of undertakings” and makes advice far
less valuable.25 Furthermore, the appellants argued that the General
Court’s decision makes the law less certain because it provides a
different standard for evidence and privilege than the standards that
many member states have in their domestic competition investigations.26
Third, the appellants argued that the General Court’s judgment
violates the “principle of national procedural autonomy and the principle
of the conferred powers.”27 Privilege is an aspect of EU law that has not
been fully harmonized across the different member states, which means
that this procedural issue should be determined based on the member
states’ rules.28
In response to Akzo/Akcros’s first item of appeal, the ECJ said that
the General Court correctly interpreted AM & S Europe: it is clear “both
from the in-house lawyer’s economic dependence and the close ties with
his employer, that he does not enjoy a level of professional independence
comparable to that of an external lawyer.”29 In-house and outside
counsels have different levels of independence and are thus differently
situated so that a claim of unequal treatment cannot be brought.30 Also,
the ECJ said that membership in a national bar association, such as the

21

Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 32.
24
Id. ¶¶ 65–66.
25
Id. ¶ 90.
26
Id. ¶ 98.
27
Id. ¶ 109.
28
Id. ¶ 110.
29
Id. ¶ 49.
30
Id. ¶¶ 58–59.
22
23
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Netherland’s bar, cannot guarantee the independence of an in-house
attorney.31
Regarding the appellants’ second claim, the ECJ found no evidence of a
change in general movement among the EU member states toward
allowing privilege to in-house counsel.32 Furthermore, while there have
been changes in EU competition law, none of those changes require that
in-house counsel and outside attorneys be treated equally with regards to
privilege.33 Also, the ECJ did not buy the arguments based on the rights
of defense34 or the principle of certainty.35
The ECJ similarly treated the appellants’ third ground of appeal. The
appellants argued that the EU did not have a rule on privilege, which
meant that, under the principle of national procedural autonomy, each
member state would decide the procedures.36 However, the ECJ said that
enforcement of EU competition rules requires a uniform application of
privilege doctrines.37 Member states’ laws and procedures do not apply
unless they assist the Commission in the investigation. For these reasons,
there is no basis to apply the principle of national procedural autonomy.38
The appellants failed to convince the Court to side with any of their
claims and the ECJ dismissed the case without any changes to the
restriction on privilege for in-house counsel.
III.

IS AKZO CORRECT?

This decision has met a great deal of opposition from the legal
industry. Akzo is what some consider “an antiquated view of the in-house
legal practice”39 and is puzzling for several reasons. Although the Akzo
decision correctly follows precedent, it is important to analyze whether
the precedent is correct. In AM & S Europe, the main precedent relied on
in Akzo, the ECJ decided on a similar dispute over what documents the
Commission could take in a competition law investigation. The ECJ
looked at the relevant laws of member states on the issue and decided
that the privilege of confidentiality afforded to written communication
between an attorney and his or her client should be subject to two
conditions: that “such communications are made for the purposes and in
the interests of the client’s rights of defense and, on the other hand, they
emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not
bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”40
31

Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶¶ 73–76.
33
Id. ¶ 83.
34
Id. ¶¶ 92–97.
35
Id. ¶¶ 100–07.
36
Id. ¶ 113.
37
Id. ¶¶ 114–15.
38
Id. ¶¶ 119–20.
39
Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, ACC Says Akzo Decision in European Court Refusing to
Recognize Legal Professional Privilege For In-house Counsel is Poor Policy (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/pressreleases/Akzo-Decision-in-EJC-is-Poor-Policy.cfm.
40
Case 155/79, supra note 8, ¶ 21.
32
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The policy implications of encouraging attorney independence are
clear.41 However, the ECJ—both in AM & S Europe and Akzo—
advanced the idea that outside attorneys are independent and used little
concrete evidence to support its position. While in-house attorneys are
directly employed by their client, outside attorneys are also employed by
the client. The main difference is that outside attorneys have multiple
clients. However, it is hard to see how being an outside attorney makes
him or her sufficiently independent so as to benefit from privilege. An
outside attorney who has been a company’s main counsel for fifty years
may be less independent than an in-house counsel who is one year
removed from finishing his or her legal studies. One commentator stated
that the ECJ “has locked into place the notion that in-house lawyers are
not capable of independent judgment under EU professional standards.”42
Furthermore, “the idea that professional independence stems from the
type of office a lawyer works in, rather than from their moral and
professional compass, evidences a deep misunderstanding of legal
professionalism and lawyers.”43 It does not make sense to keep an
artificial distinction that cannot be relied upon to determine whether or
not a lawyer will act independently.
Despite the appellants’ claims that the legal situation in the EU has
changed, the ECJ gave no consideration to how the world, the EU, and
the law have evolved since 1982. The EU has evolved since 1982, when
AM & S Europe was decided. There have been multiple EU treaties that
have had a very significant impact on many areas of EU law, and the
number of member states—ten in 1982—has now grown to twentyseven.
Perhaps the most significant of these changes over the past thirty
years, however, is the advent of electronic communication. This alone
should be a tremendous factor in support of reconsidering AM & S
Europe. With an outdated law on communication that does not take into
account the volume of electronic communication that exists today, the
ECJ effectively removed the ability of in-house counsel to use e-mail, or
other electronic communication for a great deal of purposes. The ECJ’s
decision in Akzo seems dated in another sense: “The ECJ has not
recognised that there has been any increase of importance of in-house
lawyers nor their close involvement in competition compliance.”44 The
ECJ correctly followed precedent; however, it seems that the Akzo
decision is incorrect because it fails to take into account the myriad
technological and political changes that have occurred since the early
1980s.
41
In the United States these policy implications are embedded in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010) (“In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”).
42
Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 39.
43
Id.
44
ECJ Rules on Privilege for In-House Lawyers, REEDSMITH (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.reedsmith.com/our_people.cfm?cit_id=28860&faArea1=customWidgets.content_view_
1&usecache=false.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AKZO

There are a large number of additional policy arguments in favor of
extending privilege to in-house counsel. For example, not extending
privilege harms clients, attorneys, and may even hinder the Commission
in its role of enforcing competition laws. The ECJ in Akzo failed to see
the potential harm, believing instead that withholding privilege means
more effective regulation of EU law. Finding the proper balance between
allowing attorney-client privilege and Commission interests in effective
regulation will better benefit both parties.
Withholding privilege from the in-house attorney-client relationship
harms corporations in many ways. Without privilege, corporate clients
are faced with an impossible dilemma. They either must not exchange
any documents or e-mails with their in-house counsel, effectively
ignoring efficiency enhancing tools essential in the twenty-first century,
or they can choose to be put “at a disadvantage by forcing [themselves]
to divulge confidential communications to the Commission, thus
jeopardizing their standing in litigation matters, as well as day-to-day
business.”45 Neither of these outcomes is desirable.
In addition, clients must be able to freely and openly discuss and
explore all of their legal options with their in-house counsel without the
fear of the Commission scouring the information for possible illegalities.
Withholding privilege “weakens, from a competition law perspective, the
relationship between in-house lawyers and their employers.”46 By
granting privilege, the client would not be disadvantaged by using inhouse counsel. In no area of the law is this truer than in competition law,
where attorneys give legal advice that will be relied upon to determine
whether a proposed action is legal or illegal.
A potentially drastic effect of not extending privilege is that the
corporate client can face liability in other jurisdictions based on what the
Commission can discover. “Consequences are potentially far reaching,
as, for example, with U.S. privilege law, where disclosure to the
Commission could be seen to amount to voluntary disclosure resulting in
a waiver of privilege in U.S. legal proceedings.”47 This could be
disastrous for multinational companies that are subject to laws in both
the EU and the U.S., especially companies dealing with competition
investigations. Competition authorities are becoming increasingly
aggressive as companies and industries are becoming increasingly global
in nature. A number of authorities around the world would jump at
Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 39.
Dechert LLP, Legal Privilege Rule: ECJ Affirms Akzo Nobel No Privilege for
Communications with In-House Counsel in EU Investigations, DECHERTONPOINT, 3 (Sept. 2009),
http://www.dechert.com/library/Antitrust_59_9-10_Legal_Privilege_Rule.pdf.
47
Bryan Cave, The European Court Of Justice Dismisses Appeal For Legal Professional
Privilege For In-House Lawyers, BRYAN CAVE BULLETINS, 2 (Sept. 17, 2010),
http://bryancave.com/bulletins/list.aspx?Date=2010 (scroll down to the publication date; then follow
“The European Court of Justice Dismisses Appeal For Legal Professional Privilege For In-House
Lawyers” hyperlink).
45
46
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information and communications waived mandatorily by companies in
the EU. To prevent these disastrous results, the ECJ should allow inhouse attorneys the benefit of privilege. The EU should consider this
possibility in its policy-making decisions by looking at the adverse
impact that withholding privilege could bring to its citizens and
companies in competition investigations abroad.
Furthermore, the withholding of privilege from in-house counsel
harms companies by discouraging them from hiring or keeping in-house
counsel. It is not desirable to encourage corporations to shy away from
hiring in-house counsel because in-house counsel benefits both the
corporation and the individual attorney and is both efficient and costeffective. Similarly, the legal profession will suffer if there are fewer
jobs available in-house based on a fear of hiring attorneys because of
lack of privilege.
Lack of privilege limits the effectiveness of in-house counsel.
Because many companies will likely shy away from full disclosure to
their in-house counsel, attorneys will not be able to fully advocate;
information is vital to helping the attorney fully perform his or her
duties.48 Furthermore, in-house attorneys often provide an “invaluable
role in the daily work of their employers, in particular their intimate
knowledge of the business, their ability to meet the needs of their
employer for time-critical advice, and their need to be involved in
internal compliance programs.”49 By encouraging attorneys to not work
in-house or by discouraging full disclosure, attorneys will lose much of
their niche. They might be able to use it in a law firm setting, but they
also might not be able to as effectively or at all. With multiple clients,
outside attorneys cannot give the same attention to the corporation as inhouse counsel. The resultant harm is that both the client and attorney lose
the expertise provided by in-house counsel. In all areas of the law,
including the competition setting, expertise on the laws and procedures is
essential. Discouraging such expertise and focus afforded by in-house
counsel is a bad policy result of Akzo.
In the aftermath of Akzo, one firm advises that in-house attorneys do
the following: “Conduct company investigations orally; Resist preparing
notes, minutes or files related to company investigations; Review
electronic mail policies related to communications; Instruct external
lawyers to provide advice in the context of defense.”50 Attorneys cannot
do their job properly with these restrictions. It is not a good idea to
discourage attorneys from taking notes or to limit their use of necessary
means and devices to properly effectuate their duties. Without privilege,
48

See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
Jones Day, Antitrust Alert: European Court of Justice Upholds Judgment That EU Legal
Professional Privilege Does Not Extend to In-house Lawyers, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS (Sept.
2010), http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--european-court-of-justice-upholds-judgment-thateu-legal-professional-privilege-does-not-extend-to-in-house-lawyers-09-15-2010/.
50
Robert Campbell & Kathleen Smith Ruhland, ECJ Decision in Akzo Nobel: Missed
Opportunity to Extend In-House Privilege, FAEGRE & BENSON (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.faegre.com/12144.
49
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attorneys and the corporations they serve will feel required to adopt these
types of poor business practices to protect the legitimate privacy interests
of the company. If in-house attorneys had privilege, they would be able
to effectively advocate through taking notes in meetings, sending emails, and so forth.
Surprisingly, extending privilege could also benefit rather than
hinder the Commission in its competition and other enforcement. Some
argue that the ruling in Akzo could actually make it more difficult for the
Commission to fulfill its responsibilities:
The rigid position taken by the ECJ will also likely impede the
regulatory compliance roles increasingly performed by experienced
in-house counsel and shift the role in internal investigations to
outside law firms who retain the benefits of legal privilege but who
often lack a thorough knowledge of the business and the implications
of various business practices.51
Reliance on the vital role that in-house counsels play in competition
compliance will be reduced.52 Furthermore, shifting regulatory
compliance to less-experienced outside law firms may result in more
infringements of the law, while inhibiting the Commission’s ability to
effectively investigate those infringements. Extending privilege to inhouse counsel would be an excellent way for the EU to promote the
important, expert role that many in-house attorneys play.53 While
extending privilege would restrict the amount of documents Commission
investigators could view, the role of in-house counsel would prove more
useful because they would help their companies comply with regulations
and willingly participate in Commission investigations.
Although there are a number of strong arguments in favor of
extending privilege, there is an important reason for not doing so:
withholding privilege will likely discourage illegal behavior. For good
reason, EU courts “want to ensure that deeply hidden facts in cases
involving clandestine behavior are uncovered. The top European courts
want to limit any exception to that rule, and to confine privilege to advice
from external lawyers.”54 The Commission’s evidence gathering will be
much easier if there are no privilege restrictions. More documents will be
available and, with this evidence, the Commission’s role of enforcing
competition laws will likely be more effective. This might have a strong
deterrence effect on those who consider violating the competition and
51

Hugh F. Bangasser et. al, EU's Highest Court Refuses to Extend Privilege to
Communications with In House Lawyers, K & L GATES (Sept. 17, 2010),
http://www.klgates.com/eus-highest-court-refuses-to-extend-privilege-to-communications-with-inhouse-lawyers-09-17-2010/.
52
ReedSmith, supra note 44.
53
Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 39.
54
John Spano, No In-House Counsel Privilege in Europe — EU High Court, LAW FORWARD
(Sept. 14, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://lawforward.legalzoom.com/competition/no-in-house-counselprivilege-in-europe-eu-high-court/.

9

WINTER 2011

Akzo and the Debate on In-House Privilege

other laws because investigations and enforcement will likely be more
frequent and the Commission will act with confidence of the outcome.
Furthermore, one could say that there should not be a problem with
viewing a company’s documents if the company is observing the law. A
stronger privilege would give cartels more opportunities to avoid
consequences while hiding behind the protection of confidentiality.
Furthermore, it can be said that arguments against Akzo are
overstated because, in reality, Akzo changes nothing. In-house attorneys
in EU member states did not have privilege in Commission competition
investigations since AM & S Europe. The ECJ is not taking anything
away from in-house attorneys because they did not have the privilege
before the Akzo decision. All of the dire consequences that will
supposedly result from this decision might not even happen if they have
not already.
V. SHOULD THE ECJ HAVE EXTENDED PRIVILEGE OR SHOULD IT IN
THE FUTURE?
The EU is faced with the dilemma of balancing the need for in-house
counsel’s freedom to communicate and the need to allow EU
investigators the ability to conduct thorough investigations. A U.S. court
concisely explained why the United States has adopted privilege: “The
privilege’s central concern, and its ultimate justification, is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice.”55 While there are clear benefits of having the
privilege, the government also needs to have evidence in order to punish
illegal activity. This is especially true in cases of potential competition
law violations, where evidence is often scarce. The EU recognizes this:
outside lawyers and their clients already enjoy the benefits of privilege.
The main issue is whether it should extend to in-house counsel.
This decision comes down to what the EU values more—
confidentiality and the ability of attorneys to advocate without hesitation
or the ability to sufficiently enforce competition law. The ECJ published
their preference in Akzo: enforcement of competition law is paramount.
Because this is important to the functioning of the EU and the welfare of
companies and consumers, it is hard to dispute. As a result, clients of inhouse attorneys will suffer. While the ECJ did not decide so, it is
possible to find a compromise that will extend privilege to in-house
attorneys while also allowing the Commission to discover documents
that show illegal intent or behavior.
A middle-road approach better balances the competing interests at
issue, and the extremes of absolute rejection and absolute adoption of the
privilege for in-house counsel are not desirable. A complete privilege
55
In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 414 (Ill. 2006) (quoting Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
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would bar the Commission from using any attorney-client
communication, a primary source of evidence in competition
investigations. On the other hand, having no privilege would also be
undesirable because companies need to have assurance that they can
keep communications with their in-house attorneys confidential in order
to do business. Using a system similar to the U.S. system would answer
all of these concerns: privilege exists for all attorneys—outside or inhouse—in their communications with clients, but “does not extend to
communications ‘made for the purpose of getting advice for the
commission of a fraud’ or crime.”56 With a “crime-fraud exception,” as it
is called in the United States, for in-house attorney-client
communication, the supposed lack of independence would not matter
because the Commission could discover the communications. Any
motive that an in-house counsel—or outside attorney—might have to
conceal the client’s illegal behavior would be countered by the threat that
those communications may not be protected by privilege. The U.S.
crime-fraud exception has another benefit: an independent judiciary
should decide whether a document is privileged.57 U.S. District Courts
have discretion to determine whether a document is a part of the crimefraud exception or if privilege protects it.58
While the U.S. system does not always provide the best solution for
competition enforcement, the crime-fraud exception offers a solution that
gives both sides the most they can get out of a difficult situation where
compromise is necessary. The Commission can get documents that show
illegal intent, and the attorneys can rest assured that courts will protect
legal behavior. Courts will not protect documents that show intent to do
illegal behavior; No attorney can legitimately claim otherwise. This
exception might even benefit the EU because attorneys aiding companies
in illicit competition will feel more confident expressing opinions. This
might lead to a slip up that the Commission can later discover due to a
manifestation of intent to carry out illegal behavior. With no privilege,
attorneys and clients in in-house settings will write significantly less, and
exchange fewer e-mails, which will make the Commission’s job of
finding evidence of cartels and other competition law violations
extremely difficult.
One might legitimately ask whether privilege for in-house counsel
should depend on whether the attorney is a member of the national bar.
Dependence on national bars would create several difficulties for the EU
and member states. This issue arose in Akzo, as the appellants claimed
that the Dutch attorney in question had a duty to stay independent based
on his membership in the Netherlands’ bar.59 With a union of twenty56
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting O’Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.
C. 581, 604 (P.C.)).
57
See infra Part V (last few paragraphs) for more discussion on this topic and how it could be
used to resolve future claims of privilege by companies facing European Commission investigations.
58
In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. at 420.
59
Case C-550/07, supra note 9, ¶ 36.
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seven countries and without an EU bar association, it is difficult to base
any EU rights or privileges on national bar association membership
because there are differences between the laws and obligations governing
attorneys in one member state of the EU as compared to another.
Considering the frequency with which legal business and attorneys cross
borders, especially in the common market of the EU (as seen in Akzo),
any attempts to base privilege on membership of a national bar would
become quite confusing. Furthermore, because some countries have
established a national bar where privilege for in-house counsel does
exist, these attorneys would become very desirable for companies across
the EU because they could then rely on privilege. Also the member states
that allow privilege would likely be flooded with applications to join
their national bar.
In addition, to allow privilege to be determined based on national bar
association membership might lead to discrimination in Commission
competition investigations, which could violate the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Ever since the EU’s
foundational treaty, the Treaty of Rome, a prohibition on discrimination
on the basis of nationality has existed under Article 18 of the TFEU,
which reads: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and
without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”60
Thus, allowing the Commission to discover documents from
attorneys of one country who do not enjoy the benefits of privilege while
not discovering the documents of attorneys from another country who do
have privilege, though unintentional, would still be discriminatory.
Discrimination under Article 18 need not be overt and intentional; it can
be covert, and still illegal, as long as discrimination occurs.61 It is unclear
if the EU would find that the Commission violated this article because
the Commission could argue that it is just following member state bar
regulations. Nevertheless, such an argument goes against basing
privilege on membership in a national bar association. Further, basing
privilege on nationality could also create problems with the TFEU’s
provisions regarding the free movement of workers62 and the freedom to
provide services.63
However, to require that an in-house attorney be a member of the
national bar of any EU member state—not just one specifically—would
not constitute discrimination under the TFEU because nothing prevents
the EU from treating non-EU nationals differently than EU nationals.
The issue of membership in a national bar is a concern of many in-house
attorneys in the United States regarding their work in the EU because
they find no protection for their communications with EU companies in
60
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18, Dec. 13, 2007, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 01
[hereinafter TFEU].
61
See, e.g., Case C224/00 Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-2965, ¶ 15.
62
TFEU, supra note 60, art. 45.
63
Id. art. 56.
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the text of Akzo.64 However, nothing compels the EU to extend privilege
to non-EU nationals and that is not likely to change. A policy based on
the U.S. crime-fraud exception, where all EU member-state attorneys
enjoy privilege with their clients except in situations of illegality or
fraud, would not violate the TFEU articles.
Another aspect of Akzo that the EU should fix in regards to
Commission competition investigations is the authority that the
Commission has to determine whether documents are privileged. One of
the more troubling aspects of Akzo is that the Commission took upon
itself the decision of whether privilege applied to the documents in
question. When Akzo/Akcros objected, the Commission essentially
threatened Akzo/Akcros with an obstruction of investigation claim if
they did not allow the investigators to examine the documents.65 The
parties agreed that an Akzo/Akcros representative could watch while the
investigator looked at the documents to determine whether privilege
applied to the documents.66 Because the Commission is acting for the EU
government it surely has interests and motives that bring into question its
ability to impartially judge whether it can take documents. The
Commission wants as much evidence as it can find and likely cannot
judge independently whether documents are privileged. However, the
ECJ has said that the Commission can decide whether or not privilege
applies to a document because it has the power to take any documents
related to the investigation.67
Although its ruling upheld the
Commission’s decision, the General Court took issue with the
Commission’s infringements into the realm of privilege. In somewhat
strong language, the General Court condemned the Commission’s
behavior by considering its decision to read the documents as a breach of
the principle of privilege.68 Not only was this contrary to the “proper
administration of justice,” but it also may have irreparably harmed the
rights of those involved in the investigation.69 Such harm is likely to be
inflicted because if privilege applied to the documents the Commission
looked at, the documents likely contained information that the
Commission should not have seen.70 Whether the information is
protected would not matter; someone from the Commission would still
know what the document says based on his or her reading of it to
determine its status. He or she could use that information to obtain other
information or turn the focus of the investigation to one issue or
another.71
When the Commission does not know if a document is protected by
privilege, it “must not read the contents of the document before it has
64

See, e.g., Bryan Cave, supra note 47.
Case C-550/07, supra note 9, ¶ 3.
66
Id.
67
Case 155/79, supra note 8, ¶ 17.
68
Case T-125/03, supra note 10, ¶ 86.
69
Id. ¶ 87.
70
Id.
71
Id.
65
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adopted a decision allowing the undertaking concerned to refer the
matter to the Court of First Instance [now the General Court], and, if
appropriate, to make an application for interim relief.”72 The General
Court proposed a sound alternative: an independent judiciary rather than
one of the parties to the investigation—like the Commission—should
decide whether a document is privileged.73 The Commission would
likely balk at the idea of letting the companies determine whether a
document is privileged; likewise it should not be opposed to ceding this
power to an independent court. The General Court would be in an
excellent position to independently judge whether documents are
privileged.
VI. CONCLUSION
Privilege is a vital part of the attorney-client relationship, and the
ECJ should have extended it to in-house attorneys in the Akzo decision.
While the ECJ may have been right in Akzo to follow precedent, the
precedent—AM & S Europe—seems to be outdated and unreliable for
resolving such a complicated issue in the twenty-first century. While the
policy arguments in favor of extending privilege are clear, the opposing
arguments are also strong: privilege should not be a shield to protect
illegal behavior. This is especially true with cartels and other competition
law violations, which would thrive on the secrecy and confidentiality that
a privilege would provide.
The ECJ did not find a balance between these competing interests in
Akzo. Instead, it favored the Commission and its ability to enforce EU
law, a worthy pursuit. However, Akzo does not give attention to the
reality that privilege does not need to be, and probably should not be, an
unlimited right. It can be restricted to prevent abuse. Yet privilege should
not be restricted to the point of preventing an entire group of attorneys—
in-house counsel—from enjoying vital protections based on the
misperception that they cannot offer independent advice. A proper
balance, such as a policy modeled after the U.S. crime-fraud exception,
would fit the purposes of both sides of the debate. When the issue arises
again before the ECJ, it should consider this balance and the benefits of
extending privilege—though not unlimited—to in-house attorneys.

72
73
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